CHAPTER 1

2003-2005

CHAPTER 2

2004-2006

CHAPTER 3

2007

CHAPTER 4

2004-2009

CHAPTER 5

2009-2015

CHAPTER 6

2015

WATCH

“The moment Saddam Hussein’s statue fell…

it brought all of the security down with it.” – Ashraf Osman

EARLY POST INVASION IRAQ

CHAPTER 1

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, United States President George W Bush

claims that Iraq’s continued possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

 - an accusation that was later proved erroneous - and its support for al-Qaeda, made disarming

the country a new priority.

 

In November 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1441 affords Iraq “a final opportunity

to comply with its disarmament obligations.”

 

After seeking no further UN resolutions through the Security Council and considering further diplomatic efforts futile, Bush declares an end to diplomacy in March 2003.

 

Saddam Hussein is issued an ultimatum giving the Iraqi president 48 hours to leave the country.

 

When he refuses to leave, US and allied forces launch an attack.

 

Four countries participate with troops - United States (148,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000) and Poland (194) - invading Iraq and deposing the Baathist government of

Saddam Hussein.

 

TOPPLING SADDAM HUSSEIN

With the country shorn of its leader and its government, what began as an invasion, soon turned into an occupation.

The country was run by one person, Saddam Hussein. And you

remove that person and not attending to any security, political, economic of the country for more than 100 days, it amounts to

be gross negligence by the American administration there.”

– MOWAFFAK AL RUBAIE

The US led invasion on Iraq took just 6 weeks to bring

Saddam Hussein’s 24-year rule to an iconic end.

Labelled Operation Iraqi Freedom by the

US, the 2003 invasion of Iraq lasted

from 19 March – 1 May 2003 and marked the

start of the conflict that later came to be known

as the Iraq War.

 

Coalition forces seize Baghdad after 21 days of major combat operations.

 

 

TIMELINE OF INVASION

DE-BAATHIFICATION IN BAGHDAD GOVERNANCE

Disassemble

Shortly after the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the new, US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) introduced an extensive de-Baathification process aimed at eliminating the Baath party's influence in Iraq’s political and military affairs.

 

Despite being a secular leader, Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship was viewed by the majority Shia Muslims as inherently sectarian. Sunni minority rule saw many Shia Muslims forced out of Iraq under his regime.

 

During the de-Baathification process, the CPA relied heavily on the expertise of exiled Iraqi Shia Muslims. This resulted in personal bias and political score-settling becoming pervasive throughout the process.

 

De-Baathification had an enormous impact on cleansing the civil service and disbanding the military, security and other organisations central to public order.

 

 

Disbanding the army and setting up the de-Ba’athification commission became a tool of political vengeance in Ahmad Chalabi’s hands. We never recovered from those things because hundreds of thousands of people became unemployed, disillusioned, disenfranchised and took to insurgency.” – ALI KHEDERY

The de-Baathification process meant government forces were stripped of their military capabilities. At the same time, thousands of newly unemployed Iraqi soldiers turned to Sunni insurgent militias, greatly strengthening the anti-government forces.

“Two disaffected constituencies who had been mortal enemies for many years had finally decided that they had some common ground. It was just a variation on the ancient mantra of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’ - MARTIN CHULOV

The de-Baathification policy soon became a tool of political retribution

that grew more and more sectarian in its execution.

Rise of Muqtada Al-Sadr

BAATHISTS & SALAFISTS ALLIANCE

The improvised nature of Sunni attacks now combined with the Baathist know-how, pushed

the insurgency to a new scale of terror.  But for the US, Sunni violence against Shia targets was not the primary concern.

 

The more serious element of it was not seen to be the Sunni-based insurgency, but rather the various uprisings associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, who had started to organise the Mahdi Army to defend Shia interests.

 

By the spring of 2004 there were two insurgencies. There was the Sunni insurgency in the central part of the country and then there was a southern Shia insurgency led by Muqtada al-Sadr, a relatively radical Shia cleric also exploiting the opportunity to try to drag the US into a quagmire, to exhaust it, to humiliate it and to ultimately get it to withdraw.” – ALI KHEDERY

The US invasion of Iraq had spawned two insurgencies,

igniting an increasingly sectarian conflict.

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